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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to shed light on the relationship between CEO compensation and
management efficiency. It reports the results of an empirical study of a sample of
Fortune 500 firms. My hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between CEO
compensation and management efficiency. In order to try to prove my hypothesis, I
conducted several tests. The tests were performed by dividing the sample in a number of
ways and then performing a regression analysis on the data. The first test was conducted
by taking the sample as a whole, the second by dividing the sample by industry, third by
dividing the sample by market value (size), and finally by dividing the sample by salary-
to-asset ratio. The results of the first test showed that, overall, no relationship exists
between CEO compensation and the efficiency of management. The second test showed
that a relationship does exist between CEO compensation and management efficiency in
some industries. The next test showed that a positive relationship exists between the two
variables for small firms, and a negative relationship exists for large firms. The final test
also provides support for the idea that CEO compensation is related to the efficiency of
management. Although my hypothesis was not entirely correct, it did prove to be
accurate in several cases.
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Introduction
Is CEO compensation tied to performance? This study was conducted to shed
light on this question. The relationship of firm performance to CEO compensation is a
matter of concern to both the public and academics. Concern over the topic is reflected
in the April 12 issue of The Wall Street Journal. For my study, a proxy for Tobin's q,
defined as the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity divided by
the sum ofthe book value of debt and equity, will be used to measure the efficiency of
management performance. Tobin's q was chosen as the proxy for management efficiency
since it takes into account both market and book values, thereby providing an accurate
measure of company performance.
Literature Review
The question of whether CEO compensation is tied to performance has been a
controversial issue for quite some time now. Literature has been published supporting
both sides of this issue. Hampson (1991) argues that CEO compensation must be related
to hislher performance against previously agreed objectives and not anything else. He
also does not believe in "annualties" -yearly increases, because he believes that
executives will not rush off because they did not get an increase in a given year. Cox and
Power (1991) share the same opinion as Hampson. They state that CEO pay has
increased annually, surpassing inflation and profits for many years now (1991). A "truly
ethical" CEO would focus on narrowing the divergence between his own goals and those
of the shareholders. This would result in performance and pay being fairly closely
linked.
Most theories of motivation argue in favor of strong performance-reward
contingencies (Steers & Porter, 1983). The motivation assumptions underlying executive
compensation is clear: tie rewards to desired performance in order to ensure maximum
performance (Wilhelm, 1993). For CEOs, performance is typically viewed in terms of
profitability (ROE or ROI) or market share. Research evidence is mixed concerning
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whether executive compensation is closely related to company performance (Ungson &
Steer, 1984). A sample of 1,414 firms over 15 years (1935-1950) showed that CEO
compensation is related primarily to size or sales volume, not profits (Roberts, 1959).
Ciscell and Carroll (1980), and Deckop (1988) found that sales were predominant in
determining CEO compensation. Because CEO pay levels are often based on
comparative pay surveys (Kraus, 1976), it is intuitively clear that pay would covary
generally with size, regardless of performance. It is not surprising, therefore, that
researchers have argued that CEOs are more often interested in empire building than in
maximizing stock returns.
There are also those who believe that a CEO's compensation shouldn't be based
on performance. Some researchers believe that only a small fraction of the stock awards
plus bonuses for CEOs depend on meeting financial targets. Stock awards are granted as
a way of retaining CEOs. Alan Johnson (1995), managing director of compensation
consultants in New York, says of Anthony O'Reilly - long-timeChairman,President, and
CEO ofH.J. Heinz Co., "we won't pay him for performance, we will pay him 150% of
what he's worth because somebody may pay him 200% of what he's worth and we don't
want to lose him." This retention argument strikes some observers as a lame excuse to
pay underperformers more. Critics see other evidence of overly generous CEO
compensation nowadays. One sign: sizable bonus awards despite missed targets or lack
luster results. This statement is supported by Mark Bieler (1995), Bankers Trust
executive vice-president and its head of human resources, "slashing a chief executive's
salary is virtually unheard of, even where (business) performance has flipped around. "
He also argues that if too much of a CEO's compensation is incentive based, the
executive may start thinking too much like a short-term shareholder and be tempted to
pursue misguided restructurings, lay-offs, and divestitures.
Despite the above arguments, some feel that times are changing: CEOs' salaries
will be tied to performance as a standard. Former Commerce Department Secretary
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Barbara Hackman Franklin states, "It used to be that comparability was the big issue for
compensation -by industry, by size. But now, pay for performance is going to be the
standard bearer. There will be more and more of an emphasis on performance and
results, and less on comparisons" (1993). Charles Schultz (1994), President ofCFS
Compensation Consulting agrees with Barbara by pointing to what he calls the 80/20
rule. Twenty percent of CEOs receive pay that might be classified as excessive. "That
means 8 out of 10 companies do a diligent and thoughtful job putting their executive
compensation packages together. But the media lumps all CEOs together and creates this
image that CEO pay has gone through the roof." The 1990's are a decade of the
executive compensation committee. The emphasis is on what is good performance? and
the committees are finding that it is very, very complex.
Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this study is that there is a direct relationship between
CEO/Pres. salaries and management efficiency for all firms regardless of size or industry.
If a firm's management efficiency is summarized by Tobin's q, q can be used to determine
if there is a relationship between management efficiency and salaries. All firms,
regardless of size or industry, must compensate management appropriately in order to
create maximum management efficiency. These implications provide the following
research hypothesis:
Hal: There will be a positive relationship between management efficiency, as
measured by Tobin's q, and CEO/Pres. salaries as measured by the ratio
of salaries to total assets.
Data and Methodology
To test the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between management
efficiency and CEO/Pres. salaries, I sampled from the Fortune 500. Using the 1994
version of COMPACT DISCLOSURE database, I developed a listing of all CEO and
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Presidents' compensation, the firm's long-term debt, and book and market values of the
equity. After screening for data availability, 412 firms remained in the sample.
Various tests were performed on the sample in order to determine if, and what
kind of relationships exist between management efficiency and CEO/Pres. salaries. First
a regression analysis was conducted in order to see if a positive linear relationship exists
between the two variables. The market-to-book ratio was the dependent variable and the
salary-to-asset ratio was the independent variable. Another test was conducted to identify
any relationship between management efficiency and salaries by industry. The sample
was separated by two-digit primary SIC codes and only those industries with ten or more
companies in them were used in order to provide adequate and relevant analysis criteria.
A third test was performed by splitting the sample into quintiles according to market
value, with the smallest companies in the first quintile and the largest in the fifth quintile.
Once the sample was split into quintiles, a regression analysis was performed on each
quintile to test for the existence or nonexistence of a linear relationship between the
variables. The results will show if a relationship exists between the efficiency of
management and the size of the firm. The final test conducted resulted in ranking the
firms in descending order on the basis of salary-to-asset ratios and then dividing them
into quintiles. The first quintile thus comprises firms with the largest salary/asset ratio,
the second with firms in the next highest range for the choice variable, and so on. Again,
the highest and the lowest numbers were dropped in order to have an equal number of
companies in each quintile. To see if the results of this test were significant, I used two
hypotheses. The null hypothesis was: the mean of Tobin's q for the first quintile is be
equal to the mean of the Tobin's q for the fifth quintile. The alternative hypothesis was:
the mean of the Tobin's q for the first quintile is greater than the mean of the Tobin's q
for the fifth quintile. A critical value oft was then found at the .05 level of significance
in order to determine if the results were relevant.
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Results
The results of the above tests proved to be quite interesting and supportive of
some of the opinions cited earlier. When the first test results were analyzed, there was
not a relationship found at any level of significance (See Tables 1 & lA). When the
sample was divided into industries, several industries showed a relationship between the
variables either at the .05 or .10 level of significance (See Tables 2 & 2A). The
Chemicals & Allied Products industry showed a negative relationship between CEO/Pres.
compensation and management efficiency at the .05 level of significance. The Food &
Kindred Products industry also showed a negative relationship but at the .10 level of
significance. These results support researchers' views that CEOs are not paid on
performance since the more efficient the CEO, the lower his pay for these two particular
industries. The Electric & Other Electric Equipment industry showed a positive
relationship between the variables at the .10 level of significance thus supporting the
other side of this great controversy.
A rather interesting finding occurred when the sample was divided by market
values (See Table 3). For the smaller firms, there was a positive relationship between the
two variables being analyzed, and a negative relationship between the same two variables
for the larger firms. The negative relationship for the larger firms was reinforced by the
fact that the fourth and fifth quintiles showed this relationship, although at different
levels of significance. This relationship shows that the executives of smaller firms tend
to be paid more by performance, whereas the executives of large firms are compensated
according to other variables not measured in this study. These results further exemplify
the controversy and difference in opinions on the subject. Not all companies are paying
their executives on performance.
The final test resulted in the rejection of the null hypothesis, therefore showing
that a significant relationship is present between the two variables at the .05 level of
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significance (See Tables 4 & 4A). The results of this test provide support for the idea
that CEO compensation is related to performance.
Conclusion
The results of this study illustrate the reason that the controversy exists. Since
both sides of the controversy at hand are supported by different tests I conducted, it can
not be determined which counterpart is correct. Although several tests showed that a
relationship exists between CEO compensation and management efficiency, not all the
tests provided this result. The results could have turned out this way for several reasons.
The first being that the executive compensation committee is still having problems
deciding on what is "satisfactory performance", thus causing the salaries to be based on
variables other than performance. Another discrepancy could have occurred because
firms with executive compensation committee were taken in the same sample as those
without, thus causing the results to be different due to the inconsistencies in the sample.
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VARIABLE MEAN MEDIAN VARIANCE HIGH LOW










R2 ALPHA BETA T-STAT
OVERALL .044 2.200 .084 1.253
TABLEIA
REGRESSION RESULTS WITH MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO
AS DEPENDANT VARIABLE AND SALARY IASSET
RATIO AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
N = 412








Salary/Asset .781 .522 .470 2.683 .067
Ratio
Printing and MEAN MEDIAN VARIANCE HIGH LOW
Publishing
N = 17




Salary /Asset .867 .552 .421 2.664 .256
Ratio








Salary/Asset .354 .217 .085 1.316 .050
Ratio





SAMPLE DIVIDED BY 2 DIGIT SIC CODES




Salary/Asset 1.034 .951 .297 2.231 .153
Ratio








Salary /Asset 1.146 .775 1.166 5.395 .029
Ratio








Salary/Asset .758 .695 .270 2.356 .035
Ratio








Salary /Asset .864 .453 1.226 6.189 .007
Ratio









Salary/Asset 1.358 .854 2.569 6.671 .081
Ratio








Salary /Asset .770 .374 .391 2.051 .194
Ratio








Salary/Asset .673 .533 .242 2.016 .090
Ratio








Salary IAsset .670 .360 .499 3.002 .034
Ratio









Salary IAsset .781 .485 .847 6.121 .057
Ratio




.053 3.643 -.642 -1. 69ga
Printing and R2 Alpha Beta T-Stat
Publishing
N = 17
.018 2.600 -.254 -.524




.008 1.524 .177 .430
Textile Mill R2 Alpha Beta T-Stat
Products
N=l1
.075 2.098 -.416 -.851




.053 1.528 -.324 -1.395b




.006 2.195 .151 .397
TABLE2A
REGRESSION RESULTS ON SAMPLE DIVIDED
BY 2 DIGIT PRIMARY SIC CODES WITH
MARKET - TO- BOOK VALUE AS DEPENDANT
VARIABLE AND SALARY/ASSET RATIO AS
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Trans. R2 Alpha Beta T-Stat
Equipment
N = 36
.042 .947 .174 1.222





.063 2.400 .179 1.446b




.0005 2.474 .061 .067




.078 1.558 .519 1.267




.045 1.372 .152 1.017





.024 2.332 .395 1.085
a _ Si nificant at the .05 level.g
b
= Significant at the .10 level.
R2 Alpha Beta T-Stat
First Quintile .049 1.247 .091 2.021a
Second Quintile .0004 1.801 -.017 -.170
Third Quintile .016 2.390 -.119 -1.143
Fourth Quintile .020 2.906 -.120 -1.283b
Fifth Quintile .040 3.648 -.214 -1. 827a
a _
-Sl nihcant at he .05 level.
TABLE 3
REGRESSION BY FIRM SIZE QUINTILES (FIRM SIZE
DETERMINED BY MARKET VALUE -82 FIRMS IN EACH QUINTILE)
REGRESSION PERFORMED WITH MARKET -TO- BOOK RATIO
AS DEPENDANT VARIABLE AND SALARY IASSET RATIO
AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (SMALLEST FIRMS IN FIRST QUINTILE
LARGEST FIRMS IN FIFTH QUINTILE)
g
b
= Significant at the .10 level.
First MEAN MEDIAN VARIANCE HIGH LOW
Quintile




Salary IAsset 2.276 1.870 1.483 6.671 1.287
Ratio
Second MEAN MEDIAN VARIANCE HIGH LOW
Quintile




Salary IAsset 1.001 .966 .018 1.283 .812
Ratio
Third MEAN MEDIAN VARIANCE HIGH LOW
Quintile




Salary IAsset .604 .575 .012 .800 .439
Ratio
Fourth MEAN MEDIAN VARIANCE HIGH LOW
Quintile








SAMPLE DIVIDED INTO QUINTILES OF 82 BY SALARY IASSET RATIO
WITH THE HIGHEST SALARY IASSET RATIO FIRMS IN THE FIRST QUINTILE
Fifth :MEAN :MEDIAN VARIANCE HIGH LOW
Quintile




Salary/Asset .137 .151 .004 .241 .010
Ratio
R2 Alpha Beta T-Stat
First Quintile .010 2.129 .130 .910
Second Quintile .018 4.353 -1.522 -1.206
Third Quintile .003 1.814 .654 .510
Fourth Quintile .003 2.939 -1. 793 - .449
Fifth Quintile .001 2.022 -.519 -.287
T-Stat for 2.298a
Ql & Qs
= Si nificant at the .05 level.
TABLE4A
REGRESSION RESULTS OF SAMPLE DIVIDED INTO
QUINTILES, CONTAINING 82 FIRMS EACH, BY SALARY/ASSET
RATIO WITH THE MARKET -TO- BOOK VALUE AS DEPENDANT
VARIABLE AND SALARY/ASSET RATIO AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
WITH THE LARGEST SALARY/ASSET FIRMS IN THE FIRST QUINTILE
g
T-Stat for Ql & Qs is for the hypothesis that the market-to-book ratio for high
salary/asset firms is the same as the market-to-book for the low salary/asset firms.
This number is significant, thus proving the hypothesis wrong. This means that there is
a relationship between CEO salaries and management efficiency.
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